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Abstract 
We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are 
heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms 
choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in 
the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive 
equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can 
be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skill. This can be 
implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skill or by imposing a progressive labor 
earning tax. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Existence and effects of the externalities related to the investments in human
capital (HC) have been important topics of research for many years. The source of
the externalities is usually identified in the existence of knowledge spillovers creating
a wedge between private and social returns to HC. An alternative mechanism is
related to the existence of distortions creating pecuniary externalities.1 This paper
analyzes this sort of externalities in the framework of a competitive economy where
workers are heterogeneous and self-select themselves into different labor markets
by investing in different types of HC. Our main focus is on the efficiency properties
of the equilibria. We establish that they are always characterized by overeducation
at the extensive margin, since the set of workers investing in high skills is always
larger than the (constrained) efficient one.
Our result should be contrasted with the conclusion obtained by Acemoglu
(1996), a classical reference on pecuniary externalities in economies with HC. He
considers a frictional economy where workers and firms invest in human and physical
capital, respectively, before they are randomly matched. Thus, their individual in-
vestments depend upon the distribution of the investments of their potential future
partners. Due to the income allocation mechanism,2 agents do not fully appropri-
ate the marginal returns of their irreversible investments. This hold-up problem
generates undereducation at the equilibrium, so that an increase in the investments
of workers (and/or of firms) is always welfare improving. This result rests crucially
on the adoption of a pure efficiency unit set-up. In a companion paper (2012),
we study a similar framework with frictional labor markets, but with two separate
sectors using different kinds of HC, i.e., we adopt a Roy’s model with elastic in-
vestments in both human and physical capital. We establish that the equilibrium
allocation may be inefficient due to overeducation, because, at the equilibrium, too
many workers are investing in high skills. Moreover, each one of them is investing
too little effort. This difference is explained by the fact that, in Roy’s models,
workers sort themselves into the two types of skills without considering the effects
of their choices on the distribution of HC in the two labor markets. In our set-
up, the composition of the labor force in terms of HC matters because it affects
firms’ investments. The role of this "composition effect" has been previously ana-
lyzed in several papers considering two-sectors, random-matching economies with
investments in HC (among the recent ones, see Charlotte and Decreuse (2005) and
Mendolicchio et al. (2010)).
In this paper, we study the welfare impact of the composition effect in its sim-
plest set-up, with self-selection and asymmetric information, but without additional
distortions.3 In our economy, workers are heterogeneous in terms of ability and
choose to invest effort and real resources to acquire one of two types of HC, low
or high skill. The two skills are used, together with capital goods, in two distinct
production processes. Contrary to the papers mentioned above, we consider a sit-
uation where spot labor markets are perfectly competitive. The only distortion in
1The empirical and theoretical literature on externalities and HC is quite large. For fairly
recent surveys, see Moretti (2004) and Halfdanarson et al. (2010).
2 Income distribution takes place via a Nash bargaining process after a worker is randomly
matched with a firm.
3 In the matching model of Mendolicchio et al. (2012), the hold-up prolem related to the
bargaining income allocation mechanism tends to induce undereducation. The composition effect
induced by the existence of two different skills tends to induce overeducation. The net effect
depends on the quantitative relevance of the two opposite distortions.
the economy is that firms choose their investments knowing the skill characteristics
of the workers active in the labor market they face, but without knowing, at the
time these investments are made, the actual level of their innate ability (which
affects the actual level of HC they acquire). This allows us to clarify the potential
impact of the composition effect on the efficiency properties of equilibria, without
the complications due to several distortions simultaneously at play. Our model
has two driving features. First, the asymmetric information between workers and
firms on their innate ability, which is observable only ex-post. Secondly, the lack of
contractibility between firms and workers. Since spot labor markets are perfectly
competitive, the choices at the intensive margin (i.e., the level of the investments)
are always at their efficient level, given the informational and contractibility con-
straints and contingent on the partition of the agents with respect to their skill.
However, the choices at the extensive margin, i.e., the self-selection of workers into
the different skills, are always inefficient, and the set of workers acquiring high skill
is always larger than the constrained efficient one. Hence, overeducation always
holds at the equilibrium.
An additional difference with respect to the previous literature is that, since we
consider standard production functions where the inputs are quantities of (efficiency
units of) labor of the two skills, what matters is the total supply of human capital
in the different labor markets, not the average per-capita level of HC.4 It is easy
to see that one could reformulate our analysis in terms of average per capita HC
by simply imposing an appropriate reinterpretation of the production technology.
The results would not substantively change. The main point is that, in economies
with people investing in different, non fungible, skills, the composition of the labor
force has a key role. Since agents do not internalize the effect of their choices on
the distribution of HC, the sorting is typically not at its socially efficient level. In
our framework, this translates into overeducation at the equilibrium.
Different policy instruments can be adopted to mitigate the welfare effects of the
distortion. First, taxes on the direct costs of education in high skills can reduce the
overinvestment problem. Since we consider economies with quasi-linear preferences,
these taxes do not affect the workers’ choices at the intensive margin. They have
a positive effect on welfare (measured by total surplus) because of the composition
effect. Secondly, earning taxes may also have a positive welfare effect. In particular,
some small degree of progressivity of the tax system may be welfare improving. This
is because an higher marginal tax rate on high-skill, high-wage earnings shrinks
the set of people investing in these skills. Of course, positive marginal tax rates
have a negative incentive effect on the effort invested in acquiring HC. Still, when
the initial tax rate (or the elasticity of the labor supply) is sufficiently small, the
negative impact on welfare of the - distortionary - incentive effect of the earning
tax can be dominated, from the quantitative view point, by its positive impact via
the composition effect.
We consider a parametric and stylized set-up. In particular, as already men-
tioned, workers have quasi-linear preferences and the production processes using
the two skills are completely independent. The first restriction is convenient for
analytic simplicity. Moreover, it allows us to focus exclusively on efficiency issues,
which are our main concern. On the downside, quasi-linearity of preferences rules
out any meaningful consideration of distributional issues which are obviously an
4 In the formal model, average human capital and aggregate human capital do, in fact, coincide.
However, in terms of interpretation what matters is the total human capital in each labor market
and its average across different, "local", labor markets for the same skill.
important consideration in the definition of public policies related to investments
in HC. It also implies that our results concerning the role of taxes are best seen
as a way to better understand the effects of the distortion we are considering and,
definitely, not as a contribution to the blossoming literature on the optimal taxation
in economies with HC.5 Still, our results on the welfare impact of the composition
effect may be of some interest for this literature, too. In particular, they suggests
that some of the conclusions reached in pure efficiency unit models may fail to be
robust when one considers Roy’s economies. To focus the analysis on independent
production processes (one for each skill level) simplifies the analysis. However, the
main qualitative results hold in richer structures of the production sector.
Finally, we focus on economies with purely pecuniary externalities. It is quite
intuitive that a similar phenomenon may take place in economies where investments
in HC generate technological externalities, provided that the spillover effects are
not homogeneous across the different types of HC.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the class of
economies, the notion of equilibrium and presents existence and main properties of
the equilibrium. Section 3 is the core of the paper and contains the welfare analysis.
Some final considerations follow.
2. THE MODEL
The economy has two key features. First, workers are heterogeneous with re-
spect to some parameter which affects their choice of the type of skills they acquire
investing in education and the actual level of HC that they obtain. Secondly, when
choosing their optimal investments in physical capital, firms do not know precisely
the level of HC of the workers they will actually be able to hire. The simplest
way to formalize these properties is the following. The economy is composed by a
continuum of islands, denoted by δ ∈ [d, d], endowed with the Lebesgue measure,
and interpreted as local labor markets. On each island there is an interval [0, 1] of
workers also endowed with the Lebesgue measure. Workers are denoted by a pair
(i, δ) ∈ [0, 1] × [d, d]. They are identical within each island (i.e., with respect to
the index i), but heterogeneous across islands, because of the parameter δ, whose
realization in a given island is, ex-ante, private information of the workers. This
parameter can be interpreted as describing their "innate ability" and it affects the
workers’ choices related to the acquisition of HC. Workers self-select into one of the
two labor markets characterized by different skills. We will denote all the variables
related to "high skills" with a superscript s = e, to "low skills" with s = ne. Given
their choice of a skill type, workers then choose their optimal level of HC. Their
choices at the extensive margin induce a partition ∆P ≡ {∆ne,∆e}, with workers
of type δ acquiring high skills if and only if δ ∈ ∆e. In the sequel, given a partition
∆P , we will use δs ∈ ∆s to refer to the realization of δ, with δ ∈ ∆s.
There is a large number of potential firms, denoted by j, endowed with the
same technology. They may use one or both of two different production processes.
The first uses capital and high skill labor. The second, capital and low skill labor.
Production takes place under constant return to scale, and each firm has production
function Yj(.) =
∑
sA
sK
s(1−a)
j L
sa
j . Hence, there are two perfectly substitutable
5The classical references on the effects of income taxes on the accumulation of HC are Ben-
Porath (1970), Heckman (1976), and Eaton and Rosen (1980). More recent contributions in-
clude Andenberg (2009), Andenberg and Andersson, (2003), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Jacobs
(2005), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011), Jacobs et al. (2012).
production processes, one using high skill labor and one type of physical capital,
the other using low skill inputs. To simplify, but without any loss of generality,
we assume that the unit price of capital goods (which is anyway exogenous) is
invariant across s, and equal to 1. The price of output is also fixed and equal to
one. Furthermore, we assume that production using high skill labor has higher
total factor productivity, i.e., that Ae > Ane. What really matters is that, for a
given level of inputs, the production process using high skill labor is more valuable,
i.e., that, for each (K
e
j , L
e
j) =(K
ne
j , L
ne
j ), p
eAeK
e(1−a)
j L
ea
j > p
neAneK
ne(1−a)
j L
nea
j .
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This can happen because Ae > Ane or because the two processes produce different
commodities and the one obtained using high skill labor has an higher price. For
notational convenience, we fix pne = pe = 1 and assume Ae > Ane. Before choosing
their investments in physical capital, firms are matched with one local labor market
for one, or both, the skills levels.7 Firms’ decisions take place in two stages. In
the first period, an interval [0, 1] of firms, endowed with the Lebesgue measure, is
matched with an island. These firms learn the types of workers they will be able
to hire (i.e., if s = e or s = ne), and the equilibrium partition ∆
P
. However, they
do not know the actual realization δ ∈ ∆s. In the same period, firms choose their
optimal investments K
s
j , s = ne, e. In the second stage, the actual levels of HC of
the workers become observable, labor markets open and clear at the competitive
wages and production takes place.
In the sequel, we will show that, at each equilibrium, ∆
P
=
(
[d, δ
)
, [δ, d])8
for some threshold δ, so that the partition ∆
P
can be written ∆(δ) and it can
be directly identified with δ. Therefore, ex-ante, given the equilibrium wage map
w (.) ≡ {wne (.) , we (.)} and δ, each firm chooses its optimal plan solving the opti-
mization problem
max
(Kj ,Lj)
E((Yj −
∑
s
ws(.)Lsj)|δ)−
∑
s
Ksj , (Π)
where E(.|δ) is the conditional expectation of its argument with respect to the parti-
tion induced by the threshold δ. Let Kj(w (.) ; δ) = {Kne(wne (.) ; δ),Ke(we (.) ; δ)}
and Lj(w (.) ; δ) = {Lnej (w
ne (.) ; δ), Lej(w
e (.) ; δ)} denote firm j′ s demand func-
tions. Evidently, they are j−invariant. Given the time-structure of the economy,
the demand for capital goods does not depend upon the realization (δne, δe) , while,
in general, the demand for labor depends upon this realization and, indirectly, upon
the partition ∆(δ), because this affects the level of physical capital.
Consider now the workers. They self-select into one of the two labor markets
characterized by different kinds of skills and, then, choose their optimal level of
HC. Since we are just interested in efficiency issues, it is convenient to impose that
individual preferences are described by a quasi-linear utility function, and, without
any essential loss of generality, we set U (Cs, hs) = Cs − 1
δ
hs1+Γ
1+Γ
. Our preferred
interpretation is that each worker inelastically supplies one unit of time. hs is
his effort in the acquisition of HC, which converts 1-to-1 into efficiency units of
6We impose sector invariance of the exponent α to simplify notation. Nothing essential depends
upon this assumption.
7Given the production function, it is immaterial if they can actually hire both low-skill and
high-skill workers. For notational simplicity, we will usually assume that each firm hires just one
type of workers, i.e. that it is matched with a labor market for just one skill level.
8Workers with δ = δ are actually indifferent between the two skills. Without loss of generality,
we assume that they choose s = e.
labor of skill s, for s = ne, e. Acquisition of high skills requires effort, he, and
a direct cost T.9 Hence, Ce = wehe − T, while Cne = wnehne. The parameter δ
affects the marginal disutility of effort and, consequently, all the choices related
to the investment in HC. To fix ideas, we may think of it as a parameter defining
the innate ability of the individuals. This utility function delivers two convenient
properties: first, it allows for a simple parameterization of the marginal disutility
of effort, hence of the optimal level of HC across islands. Secondly, it allows us to
explicitly compute the supply function of HC.10
For future reference, we study workers’ optimal behavior given a vector of taxes
ξ ≡ (τne, τe,∆T ) , where τs is the marginal tax rate on labor income in sector
s. ∆T are taxes (or subsidies) on the direct costs of education in the high skills.
Since, at the equilibrium, labor income is always higher for workers in sector e,
(τne, τe) , with τe > τne, describes the usual progressive, step-linear, labor income
tax system.
Notice that, given the characteristics of the production function, for each s
and each pair (δe, δne), ws only depends upon the investments in capital of type
s and the realization δs. Hence, workers face no actual uncertainty, and we can
write the wage equilibrium maps as w(δne, δne; δ, ξ) ≡ {wne(δne; δ, ξ), we(δe; δ, ξ)},
giving the equilibrium wages associated with the partition ∆(δ) and the realization
(δne, δe) ∈ ∆ne×∆e.Within each island, workers are identical, thus we will mostly
omit the index i. Their choices can be described considering first their optimal
solution to the two optimization problems
max
hs
Us(Cs, hs; δ), (Us)
for s = ne, e. Let Hs
(
δ; δ, ξ
)
be the supply function, conditional on s. Let V s(δ; δ, ξ)
be the associated value functions. Evidently, a worker acquires HC of type e if and
only if V e
(
δ; δ, ξ
)
≥ V ne
(
δ; δ, ξ
)
.
Equilibrium is defined by market clearing and individual optimization, under
the assumption that expectations are rational.
D 1. An equilibrium is a measurable partition ∆
(
δ
)
and a wage map
w(δne, δne; δ, ξ) such that
i. {Kj , Lj(.)} solves (Πj) , for each (δ
ne, δe) ∈ ∆ne
(
δ
)
×∆e
(
δ
)
,
ii. {Cs(.),Hs (.)} solves (Us), for each δs ∈ ∆s
(
δ
)
, for s = ne, e,
iii. V e(δ; δ, ξ) ≥ V ne(δ; δ, ξ) for each δe ∈ ∆e
(
δ
)
,
iv. V ne(δ; δ, ξ) ≥ V e(δ; δ, ξ) for each δne ∈ ∆ne
(
δ
)
,
v. for each pair (δe, δne) and each s, Hs
(
δ; δ, ξ
)
= Ls(ws (.) ; δ).
Evidently, (i− ii) impose individual optimization. (iii) imposes that the utility
of a worker with δ ∈ ∆e
(
δ
)
is at least as large if he acquires high skills than if he
invests in low skills. (iv) imposes the analogous condition for unskilled workers. (v)
are the market clearing conditions.11
For this economy, an equilibrium exists. We start with an arbitrary threshold δ̂
and an arbitrary pair of firm-invariant investments, K̂.We then compute the wage
9Similar results would hold if there were time costs, too.
10Given the structure of production, similar results hold for a more general class of quasi-linear
utility functions, with a general, strictly convex function 1
δ
vs
(
hs
i
)
.
11Since there is a measure 1 of identical workers and firms on each labor market, it would be
pedantic to distinguish between individual and aggregate demand and supply.
equilibrium maps conditional on (δ̂, K̂), ŵ(δ̂, K̂). Next, given δ̂, we can use the map
ŵ(δ̂, K̂) to determine the optimal investments in physical capital, contingent on the
threshold. They are described by a function K̂(δ). Finally, the map ŵ(δ, K̂(δ)) can
be used to find the actual equilibrium threshold.
The equilibrium threshold is defined by the condition
V e(δ = δ; δ, ξ)− V ne(δ = δ; δ, ξ) = 0.
Using the wage maps conditional on an arbitrary threshold (see (A3) in Appendix),
we can rewrite this equality as
0 = F (δ) ≡ δ
γ−1
(1− τe)
1+Γ
Γ
(
E(δe(γ−1)|δ)
1−α
Ae
)1+Γ
αΓ
−δ
γ−1
(1− τne)
1+Γ
Γ
(
E(δne(γ−1)|δ)1−αAne
)1+Γ
αΓ
− b (T +∆T ) , (1)
where b ≡ 1+ΓΓ
(
(1− α)
1−α
α α
)− 1+ΓΓ
and γ ≡ 1+Γ1+Γ−α .A solution to eq. (1) defines an
equilibrium threshold δ. Hence, to establish the existence of an equilibrium we need
two properties. First, we need to show that the equilibrium partition has indeed
structure∆e(δ) = [δ, d], as postulated above. Secondly, a solution to F (δ) = 0must
exist. The proof is straightforward and the details are in Appendix. There, we also
establish uniqueness and comparative statics of the equilibrium. These additional
properties do not hold in general. Indeed, numerical examples show that, for some
values of the parameters, F (.) is not strictly monotonic, so that there are several
equilibria, at least for some values of T. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of the
solution to F (δ) = 0 is that the total factor productivity in sector e is sufficiently
larger than the one in sector ne.12
Proposition 1 presents our existence and uniqueness results, taking as bench-
mark the economy with a flat labor income tax and no taxes on the direct costs of
education.
P 1. Fix (Γ, α) and ξ = (τ, τ , 0) . Given (Ane, Ae, ξ),
(a) there is a set (T , T ) such that, for each T with bT1−τ ∈ (T , T ), there is an
equilibrium with threshold δ (ξ) ∈
(
d, d
)
;
(b) given Ane, there is Ae such that, for each Ae > Ae, the equilibrium is unique
and described by a C1 function satisfying ∂δ(ξ)
∂τe
< 0, ∂δ(ξ)
∂τne
> 0, and ∂δ(ξ)
∂∆T > 0.
From (A3) in Appendix, at each equilibrium, the wages (and earnings) of the
high skill workers are always strictly larger than the ones of the low skilled agents.
Hence, any skill-conditional earning tax profile (τne, τe) is equivalent to the stan-
dard tax system with variable marginal tax rates, as we have claimed above.
3. CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA
Our main purpose is to analyze the efficiency properties of the equilibria. Their
Pareto inefficiency is self-evident since firms’ investments are invariant with respect
to the realizations (δne, δe). This is due to the lack of contractibility of investments
and it reflects the basic structure of the economy. More interesting is to consider
12There are other alternative sufficient conditions delivering the same property.
the efficiency properties of the economy taking as a reference point a notion of con-
strained optimal (CO) allocation. We adopt the usual fiction of a benevolent plan-
ner maximizing total expected surplus under the appropriate constraints, reflecting
the fundamental structure of the economy. In our set-up, this is the constraint
that investments in physical capital must be selected ex-ante, before firms are ac-
tually matched with labor markets, so that they must be (δne, δe)−invariant. The
objective function of the social planner is E(W (.)), the total expected surplus:13
E(W (.)) =
∑
s
µs(∆˜)
[
AsKs(1−a)E(Lsa|∆˜)− E(
1
δ
Ls(1+Γ)
1 + Γ
|∆˜)
]
−
∑
s
Ks−µe(∆˜)T,
where µs(∆˜) is the measure of agents of type s. Evidently, for each s,[
AsKs(1−a)E(Lsa|∆˜)− E(
1
δ
Ls(1+Γ)
1 + Γ
|∆˜)
]
−Ks
is the expected surplus (including education costs) for the interval of firms matched
with an island with δ ∈ ∆˜s. Bear in mind that E(W (.)) coincides with the actual to-
tal surplus. The policy instruments of the planner are two maps {L˜ne(δne), L˜e(δe)}
fixing the labor inputs for each δne and δe, the investments in physical capital,
{K˜ne, K˜e}, and a measurable partition ∆˜. It is fairly intuitive that the CO par-
tition always has structure ∆˜ = {[d, δ˜), [δ˜, d]} so that it can be identified with a
threshold δ˜.
We establish three results: first agents’ choices at the intensive margin are al-
ways at their efficient values, conditional on the equilibrium partition ∆(δ). How-
ever, the equilibrium threshold is always different from the efficient one, so that
inefficiency is entirely due to the agents’ choices at the extensive margin. Second,
and more relevant in terms of policy implications, the equilibrium threshold is al-
ways too low, so that equilibria are always characterized by overeducation. These
two results are summarized in Prop. 2. The third result is establish in Prop. 3 and
4, where we analyze the effects on welfare of several combinations of earnings taxes
and taxes on the direct costs of education.
P 2. Under the maintained assumptions, there is a CO allocation
with threshold δ˜. Any equilibrium allocation with δ ∈ (d, d) is CO if and only if
δ = δ˜. For a generic set of economies, δ < δ˜, so that overeducation holds.
The details of the proof are in the Appendix. The core of the argument is
the following. Since, at an equilibrium, expected profits are zero, total expected
surplus, given any arbitrary threshold δ̂, can be also written, at ξ = 0, as
E(W (δ̂)) ≡
∫ d
δ̂
V e(δ; δ̂)dδ +
∫ δ̂
d
V ne(δ; δ̂)dδ.
In Appendix we show that, conditional on the value of the threshold, the surplus is
at its maximum. Hence, to establish the constrained inefficiency of equilibria, we
13Since all firms and all workers in each labor market are identical, no confusion should arise
by dropping the indexes (i, j).
just need to evaluate
∂E(W (δ̂))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ
= −
[
V e(δ = δ; δ)− V ne(δ = δ; δ)
]
(2)
+
∫ d
δ
∂V e(δ; δ̂)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δdδ
e +
∫ δ
d
∂V ne(δ; δ̂)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δdδ
ne.
The first term is zero, by definition of δ. This is the private gain from investing
in high skill for the workers at the margin. The second component measures the
effects of the change in the composition of the labor force on the wages, and, hence,
on the utilities of the inframarginal workers. This is the external effect. For each
s, V s(δ; δ̂) is increasing in E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂). Since E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂) is the expectation of
a strictly increasing function of δ̂, ∂V
s(δ;δ̂)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ
> 0, for each s, so that, at each
equilibrium, E(W (δ̂)) is increasing in the value of the threshold. Hence, equilibria
are always characterized by overeducation. The basic intuition is simple. When, at
the margin, a set of workers switches from sector e to sector ne, this increases the
expected HC in both sectors, therefore decreasing the expected equilibrium wages.
This stimulates investments in physical capital and, in turn, has a positive effect
on the equilibrium wages for all the inframarginal workers. Given that workers
optimally self-select themselves into the two labor markets, the decrease in the
wage rate for the workers switching sector is exactly compensated by the schooling
costs. Hence, at the equilibrium, an increase in the threshold has always a positive
effect on welfare.
It is worthwhile to notice two additional properties of this class of economies.
First, investments in high skills are productive, as long as Ae > Ane. However,
positive investments in these skills prevail even at the limit, when Ae = Ane.
Indeed, it is easy to see that, for each Ae ≥ Ane, lim
δ̂→d f(δ̂) > 0. Hence, for T
sufficiently small, the equilibrium threshold satisfies δ < d, for each Ae ≥ Ane. At
the limit, to invest in high skills is socially unproductive, but it is still individually
profitable, because it allows to enter a sector where investments in physical capital
are higher and, therefore, labor earnings are also higher.
Secondly, the chain of causation from a change in the threshold to a welfare
improvement is via the investments in physical capital. Given any pair {Kne, Ke},
an increase in the value of δ implies that the expected wages (per efficiency unit
of labor) are decreasing for both skills. This stimulates investments and, in turn,
induces an increase in the equilibrium wages in the inframarginal markets.
From Prop. 2, it is clear that any policy just affecting the value of the threshold
can be used to obtain a welfare improvement. Since preferences are quasi-linear,
taxes on the direct cost of education, ∆T > 0, have no effect on the choices at
the intensive margin, while they can affect in the appropriate way the ones at the
extensive margin and, therefore, the composition of the labor force in terms of HC.
When F (.) is increasing in the threshold, an appropriate, positive value of ∆T is
welfare improving since it moves δ up. Therefore, the constrained optimal alloca-
tion can be implemented choosing an appropriate (and positive) value ∆T, so that
the equilibrium threshold coincides with the CO one. Fig. 1 shows the values of the
equilibrium thresholds (the solid curve on top) and the CO thresholds (the dashed
curve lying below) for a specific economy,14 corresponding to different levels of T.
Figure 1
For each value of the cost of education T, the equilibrium value δF is below
the constrained efficient level δCO . Hence, for each T, overeducation holds. For
each T, the vertical distance between the two curves (measured at the value of
δCO) determines the value of ∆T required to implement the constrained efficient
allocation as an equilibrium.
Less obvious is that a small increase in the marginal tax rate on high earnings
(the ones of the high skilled people) can also be welfare improving. Conditional on
the threshold, private investments are at their optimal level. Hence, an increase
in the marginal tax rate always has a direct (i.e., given the threshold) negative
impact on surplus. However, it may have an indirect positive effect due to the
induced change of the equilibrium threshold. To put it differently: an increase in
the marginal tax rate distorts the supply of HC at the intensive margin, but it
can improve welfare because of its effects on the overall composition of the labor
force, i.e., at the extensive margin. An increase in the marginal rate on high income
individuals has a negative direct incentive effect, but a positive composition effect,
because it moves up the equilibrium threshold, so that the sign of the change in
welfare is, in general, indeterminate. For a perfectly inelastic supply function, an
increase in the marginal tax rate has no negative incentive effect. It has a strictly
positive composition effect because the choice at the extensive margin depends
upon the difference between the net wages in the two sectors. Hence, the effect
on welfare is positive. By continuity, an increase in the marginal tax rate for high
labor income is welfare improving whenever the elasticity of the supply function is
sufficiently small. The same result holds if the initial tax rate is sufficiently small.
On the other hand, an increase in the marginal tax rate on the low income workers
has a negative incentive and composition effect. Hence, it has, unambiguously, a
negative impact on welfare.
In the next two propositions, we take as a benchmark an economy with no
taxes and subsidies on the direct costs of education and with a sufficiently small
14The parameters are α = 2
3
, Γ = 4, [d, d] = [1, 4], Ae/Ane = 1.2. The function E(W (δ̂)) is
strictly concave in the threshold, so that
∂E(W (δ̂))
∂δ̂
= 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for
a CO allocation.
flat earning tax. Assume that workers and firms choose their optimal behavior
given a policy vector ξ. E(W (ξ)) is the total expected surplus at the equilibrium
associated with ξ. Once again, we can ignore expected profits as a component
of total surplus, since they are always zero, at the equilibrium. Using (A4) in
Appendix, total expected surplus (including the tax revenues R (ξ)) is given by
E(W (ξ)) ≡
1
b
∑
s
(Γ + τs) (1− τs)
1
Γ
Γ
µs (ξ)As
1+Γ
αΓ E(δs(γ−1)|δ(ξ))
1+Γ−α
αΓ −µe(δ(ξ))T,
where, for each s, µs
(
δ(ξ)
)
is the measure of the set of agents investing in skill s,
i.e., µe
(
δ(ξ)
)
= (d− δ(ξ)), and µne
(
δ(ξ)
)
=
(
δ(ξ)− d
)
.
P 3. Consider an equilibrium associated with ξ =
(
τ, τ ,∆T
)
,∆T =
0, τ > 0 and sufficiently small. Also, assume that ∂f(.)
∂δ
|δ > 0. Then,
i. d∆T > 0 increases total surplus,
ii. dτne > 0 decreases total surplus,
iii. dτe > 0 increases total surplus.
The proof is in Appendix. The condition ∂f(.)
∂δ
|δ > 0 determines the comparative
statics of the equilibrium threshold, and it guarantees that ∂δ(.)
∂τe
> 0, ∂δ(.)
∂τne
<
0 and ∂δ(.)
∂∆T
> 0. As established in Prop. 1 above, it always holds if the ratio
Ae/Ane is sufficiently large. A value τ not "too large" is sufficient to guarantee
that ∂E(W(ξ))
∂δ̂
> 0 at the equilibrium threshold δ(ξ). Remember that E(W (ξ))
includes tax revenues. Since the wage rate is always larger in sector e, they are
decreasing in the threshold. For τ sufficiently large, the behavior of the tax revenues
is the dominant component of E(W (ξ)) and it may be ∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
< 0. Sufficiently
small values of τ rule out this possibility and guarantee that ∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
> 0. These
conditions are sufficient to establish (i − ii). Property (iii) requires an additional
restriction. τ (or, alternatively, 1Γ ) must be sufficiently small, because, for general
values of the parameters, the sign of ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
is indeterminate.
Consider now policies where reductions in the income taxes are financed through
taxes on the direct costs of education, or by revenue neutral changes (dτe, dτne).
P 4. Let ξ = (τ, τ ,∆T ), with ∆T = 0, τ > 0 and sufficiently small.
Assume that Γ
1+Γ
> τ and ∂f(.)
∂δ
|δ > 0. Consider balanced budget policies (dτe, dτne)
and (dτs, d∆T ) . Then,
i. (dτe,−dτne) >> 0 increases total surplus,
ii. (−dτne, d∆T ) >> 0 increases total surplus,
iii. (−dτe, d∆T ) >> 0 increases total surplus.
The proof is, once again, in Appendix. The restriction Γ1+Γ > τ implies that,
given the value of the threshold, in each sector we are on the increasing part of the
Laffer’s curve. The Prop. shows that it may be welfare improving to move from
a flat income tax to a progressive one. A welfare improvement also follows by a
decrease in the marginal tax rate on "low" labor incomes, financed by increasing
taxes on the direct costs of education. This is quite intuitive, since the two tax
changes have positive effects both at the extensive and at the intensive margins.
Consider now a decrease in the marginal tax rate on "high" labor incomes, similarly
financed. Now, the two tax changes have opposite effects on the choices at the
extensive margin, since d∆T > 0moves up the equilibrium threshold, while dτe < 0
does the opposite. In Appendix, we show that the net effect on welfare is positive,
for sufficiently small tax rates.
4. CONCLUSION
We have established how asymmetric information and lack of contractibility may
generate negative pecuniary externalities related to HC accumulation. One of the
key features of the economy is that skills are not perfectly fungible. We consider the
polar case where the two skills are used in distinct production processes. However,
the results are robust to more general specifications of the production process.
The essential point is that workers, by choosing their education, sort themselves
into distinct labor markets. This is consistent with the Roy’s approach. When
this happens, overeducation may hold at equilibrium. To the contrary, in a pure
efficiency unit models, without sorting and with perfectly competitive spot labor
markets, equilibrium allocations would always be constrained efficient.
Our results illustrate the trade-off which exists between extensive and intensive
accumulation of HC. When agents are heterogeneous and different skills are used in
production, to enlarge the set of agents with high skills may imply a reduction of the
(across labor markets) average level of high skills HC. Provided that the distribution
of HC for a given skill matters, this may have adverse welfare effects. Simple
policy interventions can internalize the externality for the workers, implementing
the constrained efficient allocation.
Two additional features of our results should be stressed. First, workers’ in-
vestment choices affect social welfare through their impact on the investments in
physical capital. Workers’ choices at the extensive margin affect the distribution
of HC and, consequently, firms’ investments. It follows that an elastic demand
for physical capital is an essential ingredient of the analysis. Secondly, there is
asymmetric information ex-ante, because workers know their ability (i.e., the value
of their δ) while firms do not know its value for the workers they will actually
hire. However, this asymmetry disappears ex-post. Once labor markets open, firms
perfectly observe the actual HC of their employees. Therefore, the informational
problem at play is completely different from the one considered in the canonical
signalling model.
5. APPENDIX
Given the structure of the production function, the economy essentially decom-
poses into two distinct sub-economies, one for each s. Therefore, in the sequel, we
analyze separately, in particular, profits and surpluses obtained by the same firm
using the two processes.
Let γ ≡ 1+Γ1+Γ−α .
We start solving for the competitive wages given an arbitrary pair (δne, δe) and
any arbitrary pair K
s
j = K
s
, for each s and j. A straightforward computation
shows that, for each s, market clearing requires
ws(δs,K
s
) =
(
αAsK
s(1−α)
) Γ
1+Γ−α
[(1− τs) δs]
1−α
1+Γ−α
. (A1)
Given any arbitrary threshold δ̂, ex-ante expected profits of firm j in sector s are
E
(
Πsj(.)|δ̂
)
= (1− α)α
α
1−αAs
1
1−αE
(
ws(δs,K
s
)
−α
1−α |δ̂
)
Kj
s
−K
s
j. (A2)
Since expected profit must be zero, it must be
E
(
ws(δs,K
s
)
−α
1−α |δ̂
)
=
1
(1− α)α
α
1−αAs
1
1−α
,
so that, using (A1),
Ks(δ̂) = (1− α)
1+Γ−α
αΓ α
1
ΓAs
1+Γ
αΓ (1− τs)
1
Γ E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1+Γ−α
αΓ .
Substituting it into (A1), we obtain the δ̂−conditional equilibrium wage map
ws(δs; δ̂) =
(1− α)
1−α
α α
δs
1−α
1+Γ−α
As
1
αE(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1−α
α . (A3)
Hence, given δ̂, each worker’s optimal supply of HC is
Ĥs(δs; δ̂, ξ) =
[
(1− α)
1−α
αΓ α
1
Γ
]
(1− τs)
1
Γ As
1
αΓ δs
1
1+Γ−αE(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1−α
αΓ ,
and the value of the indirect utility function is
V e(δ; δ̂, ξ) =
Γ
[
(1− α)
1−α
α α (1− τe)Ae
1
αE(δe(γ−1)|δ̂)
1−α
α
]1+Γ
Γ
δe(γ−1)
1 + Γ
−(T +∆T ) ,
(A4)
for s = e. For s = ne, we obtain a similar expression. The equilibrium condition
F (δ̂) = 0, eq. (1) in the text, follows immediately.
Proof of Prop. 1. (a) Consider an arbitrary ξ, with τe = τne = τ and
∆T = 0. F (δ̂) can be rewritten as
F (δ̂) = δ̂
γ−1
([
AeE(δe(γ−1)|δ̂)1−α
] 1+Γ
αΓ
−
[
AneE(δne(γ−1)|δ̂)1−α
] 1+Γ
αΓ
)
−
bT
(1− τ)
1+Γ
Γ
≡ f(δ̂)− b̂T = 0 (A5)
Pick the partition induced by any interior threshold δ̂. Evidently,
δ
′γ−1
([
AeE(δe(γ−1)|δ̂)1−α
] 1+Γ
αΓ
−
[
AneE(δne(γ−1)|δ̂)1−α
] 1+Γ
αΓ
)
− b̂T ≥ 0
if and only if δ′ ≥ δ. Hence, any non-empty equilibrium partition satisfies ∆
e
=
[δ, d].
For each threshold δ̂, and each s, E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂) is the conditional expectation of
a strictly increasing function, hence it is strictly increasing in δ̂ and well-defined on
[d, d]. Thus, f(δ̂) is continuous and strictly positive on [d, d], including the boundary
points. Let min
[d,d]
f(δ̂) ≡ b̂T ≥ 0 and b̂T ≡ max
[d,d]
f(δ̂) > b̂T , because f(δ̂) is clearly
not constant over [d, d]. Then, by the intermediate value theorem, for each T such
that T ∈
[
T ,T
]
, there is δ (ξ) such that F (δ) = 0. Hence, an equilibrium exists.
(b) Clearly, ∂F (.)
∂T
< 0, ∂F (.)
∂τe
< 0 and ∂F (.)
∂τne
> 0. Hence, the signs of the
comparative statics properties, and uniqueness of equilibrium, follow immediately
from the sign of ∂F (.)
∂δ̂
. Let ηs(δ̂) be the elasticity of E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂) with respect to δ̂.
From (A5) , simple computations show that
sign
∂f(.)
∂δ̂
= sign

(γ − 1)
(
1−
(
Ane
Ae
) 1+Γ
αΓ
(
E(δne(γ−1)|δ̂)
E(δe(γ−1)|δ̂)
) (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
)
+ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
(
ηe(δ̂)−
(
Ane
Ae
) 1+Γ
αΓ
(
E(δne(γ−1) |̂δ)
E(δe(γ−1)|δ̂)
) (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
ηne(δ̂)
)
 .
Fix (α,Γ) . The first term is strictly positive. It is easy to check that ηe(δ) ≥ 0, for
each δ ∈ [d, d], while ηne(δ) is bounded. It follows that ∂f(.)
∂δ̂
> 0, for A
ne
Ae
sufficiently
small, because E(δ
ne(γ−1) |̂δ)
E(δe(γ−1) |̂δ)
< 1. 
Proof of Prop. 2. We start restricting the analysis to partitions ∆˜ = {[d, δ˜), [δ˜, d]}.
Fix an arbitrary pair (K̂e, K̂ne). For each δs, the optimal investment in HC is ob-
tained solving
max
hsi
AsK̂s(1−α)hsα −
1
δs
hs1+Γ
1 + Γ
with optimal solution Hs(δs, K̂s) = (αAsK̂s(1−α)δs)
1
1+Γ−α , for each s. The associ-
ated surplus is
W (δs, K̂s) =
1
γ
α(γ−1)AsγK̂s(1−α)γδ
s(γ−1)
− K̂s.
Fix an arbitrary threshold δ̂. Let µs(δ̂) be the measure of the set of workers investing
in skill s, given the partition induced by δ̂. It coincides with the measure of firms
investing in physical capital of type s.15 The optimal level of the investments in
physical capital is obtained solving the optimization problem
max
K̂s
1
γ
αγ−1AsγK̂s(1−α)γ
∫
∆s(δ̂)
δs(γ−1)dδ − µs(δ̂)K̂s.
Since (1− α) γ < 1, the problem is strictly concave. Its optimal solution is K˜s(δ̂) =
(1− α)
1+Γ−α
αΓ α
1
ΓAs
1+Γ
αΓ E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1+Γ−α
αΓ , with associated
H˜s(δs; δ̂) = δ
1
1+Γ−α (1− α)
1−α
αΓ α
1
ΓAs
1
αΓE(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1−α
αΓ .
Conditional on the threshold, these functions coincide with the equilibrium func-
tions computed above. Replacing K˜s(δ̂) and H˜s(δs; δ̂), for each s, in E(W (.)) we
obtain that, given any threshold δ̂, the maximum total expected surplus is
E(W (δ̂)) =
1
b
∑
s
µs(δ̂)As
1+Γ
αΓ E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
1+Γ−α
αΓ − µe(δ̂)T, (A6)
15We are implicity assume that each firm is matched with a labor market for just one skill. This
simplify the notation and it does not entail any loss of generality, given the production function.
a continuous function. Consider now the optimization problem
max
δ̂
E(W (δ̂)).
Continuity implies that an optimal solution δ˜ exists, either interior or on the bound-
ary. Evidently, together with {K˜ne, K˜e} and {H˜e(δe; δ˜), H˜ne(δne; δ˜)}, δ˜ defines the
CO allocation.
To conclude this part of the argument, we still need to show that the partition
{[d, δ˜), [δ˜, d]} is not dominated by any other measurable partition ∆̂. Consider (A6),
replacing E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂) with E(δs(γ−1)|∆̂s). Pick any measurable ∆̂, such that there
are sets Bne and Be of positive (and, without loss of generality, identical) measure
such, for each pair (δne, δe) ∈ Bne × Be, δne > δe. Since Ae > Ane, it is quite
obvious that we can increase E(W (.)) simply switching the two sets, i.e., setting
Bne ⊂ ∆e, and Be ⊂ ∆ne. Hence, the optimal partition ∆˜ must have structure
{[d, δ˜), [δ˜, d]}, modulo some zero measure set.
We now show that an equilibrium allocation is CO if and only if δ˜ = δ. The
“if” part is obvious, since the CO levels of the investments coincide with their
equilibrium values, conditional on the threshold.
Assume that an CO allocation is interior. Then, it must be true that ∂E(W (δ̂))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ
=
0 at the equilibrium threshold δ. Consider eq. (2) in the text. We have already
pointed out that, at any equilibrium δ, the term in square brackets is zero. More-
over, the last two terms are positive, since V s(δ; δ̂) is increasing in E(δs(γ−1)|δ̂)
which is the expected value of a strictly increasing function of δ̂. Thus, ∂E(W(δ̂))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ
>
0. 
Observe that, for ∆T = 0 and τe = τne = τ sufficiently small, ∂E(W (.))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ) >
0, since, at ξ = 0, ∂E(W(δ̂))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(0)
> 0.
For each s, define
Ss(ξ) ≡ µs(δ(ξ))
1
b
(1− τs)
1+Γ
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ E(δs(γ−1)|δ(ξ))
1+Γ−α
αΓ ,
the total utility (gross of education costs) obtained by workers in sector s.
Proof of Prop. 3. Let ∆T = 0 and pick τ = τe = τne such that ∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ) >
0. Clearly,
∂E (W (ξ))
∂τs
=
∂E (W (ξ))
∂τs
|δ(ξ) +
∂E (W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
∂δ(.)
∂τs
, for each s,
∂E (W (ξ))
∂∆T
=
∂E (W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
∂δ(.)
∂∆T
.
By assumption, ∂δ(.)
∂τe
> 0, ∂δ(.)
∂τne
< 0 and ∂δ(.)
∂∆T > 0. Hence,
∂E(W (ξ))
∂∆T > 0.
By direct computation, for each s,
∂E (W (ξ))
∂τs
= −
(1 + Γ) τs
Γ2 (1− τs)
2S
s(ξ) < 0.
Therefore, ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τne
< 0. The sign of ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
is not well-defined, because the
direct effect, ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
|δ(ξ), is negative, while the indirect one is positive. Evidently,
lim
τe→0
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
= 0, while ∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ) and
∂δ(.)
∂τe
are positive and bounded away
from 0, for each τe. Hence, for τe sufficiently small, ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
> 0. 
Proof of Prop. 4. Let ∆T = 0 and τ = τe = τne. Then,
R (ξ) ≡
∑
s
(1 + Γ) τs
Γ (1− τs)
Ss (ξ) + µe(δ(ξ))∆T
and (A7)
W (ξ) ≡
∑
s
Ss (ξ)− µe(δ(ξ)) (T +∆T ) +R (ξ)
=
∑
s
Γ+ τs
Γ (1− τs)
Ss (ξ)− µe(δ(ξ))T,
By direct computation,
∂R(ξ)
∂τs
|δ(ξ) =
1 +Γ
Γ2
Γ− (1 + Γ) τs
(1− τs)2
Ss (ξ) > 0,
since, by assumption Γ
1+Γ
> τ. Also, with a straightforward manipulation, we can
write
∂R (ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
=
∑
s
(1 + Γ) τs
Γ (1− τs)
∂Ss (ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
−∆T.
Since ∂S
s(ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
is bounded, lim
τ→0
∂R(ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
= 0 at ∆T = 0.
The map given by the equilibrium and the invariance of the tax revenues con-
ditions is
G(δ, ξ) ≡
[
F (δ; ξ)
R(δ; ξ)−R
]
=
[
0
0
]
.
Consider first the balanced budget policy (dτe, dτne). By the implicit function
Thm.,  ∂δ∂τne
∂τe
∂τne
 =

FτneRτe−FτeRτne
FτeRδ−FδRτe
FδRτne−FτneRδ
FτeRδ−FδRτe
 , (A8)
where we use, for instance, Fτe to denote
∂F (.)
∂τe
|δ. Since limτ→0
∂R(ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ) = 0, while
the other terms are bounded away from zero,
[
−FδRτe + FτeRδ
]
< 0 for τ suffi-
ciently small. Since, by construction, R(ξ) is invariant,
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τne
=
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τne
|δ +
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τe
|δ
∂τe
∂τne
+
∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
∂δ(ξ)
∂τne
=
∂Sne (ξ)
∂τne
|δ +
∂Se (ξ)
∂τe
|δ
∂τe
∂τne
+
[∑
s
∂Ss (ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
+ T
]
∂δ(ξ)
∂τne
.
Hence, using (A8),
∂E (W (ξ))
∂τne
[
FτeRδ − FδRτe
]
=
1 + Γ
Γ (1− τ)
[
(Sne (ξ)Rτe − S
e (ξ)Rτne)Fδ + (S
e (ξ)Fτne − S
ne (ξ)Fτe)Rδ
]
+
[∑
s
∂Ss (ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
+ T
]
[FτneRτe − FτeRτne ] . (A9)
At τne = τe, (Sne (ξ)Rτe − Se (ξ)Rτne) = 0. (Se (ξ)Fτne − Sne (ξ)Fτe) is positive
since Fτne > 0 and Fτe < 0. For χ (ne) = −1 and χ (e) = 1, we can write[∑
s
∂Ss (ξ)
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ) + T
]
=
(1 + Γ) (1− α)
αΓ
∑
s
Ss(ξ)χ (s)
(
E(δs(γ−1)|δ(ξ))− δ
γ−1
)
> 0,
where the inequality holds because E(δe(γ−1)|δ(ξ))−δ
γ−1
> 0 andE(δne(γ−1)|δ(ξ))−
δ
γ−1
< 0. Hence, given that [FτneRτe − FτeRτne ] > 0, the second addendum in
(A9) is also positive. Therefore, for Rδ (i.e., τ) sufficiently small in absolute value,
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τne
[
FτeRδ − FδRτe
]
> 0, and, therefore, ∂E(W (ξ))
∂τne
< 0, as claimed, since[
FτeRδ − FδRτe
]
< 0. This establishes (i) .
Let’s now consider a balanced budget policy (dτs, d∆T ) . By direct computa-
tion,  ∂δ∂∆T
∂τs
∂∆T
 =

Rτs+µ
e(.)Fτs
FδRτs−RδFτs
−
Rδ+µ
e(.)Fδ
F
δ
Rτs−RδFτs
 ,
so that
∂E(W (ξ))
∂∆T
=
∂E(W (ξ))
∂τs
∂τs
∂∆T
+
∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
∂δ(ξ)
∂∆T
Consider the policy (−dτne, d∆T ) >> 0. For τ sufficiently small,
[
FδRτne −RδFτne
]
>
0, so that ∂δ(ξ)
∂∆T > 0 and
∂τne
∂∆T < 0. Since
∂E(W(ξ))
∂τne
< 0 (see the proof of Prop. 3)
and ∂E(W(ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
> 0, this policy is welfare improving.
For the policy (−dτe, d∆T ) >> 0, ∂δ(ξ)
∂∆T
can be negative, because Fτe < 0.
However,
lim
τ→0
∂E(W (ξ))
∂∆T
=
∂E(W (ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
1
Fδ
[
1−
δ(ξ)γ−1
E(δe(γ−1)|δ(ξ))
]
.
Given that δ(ξ)
γ−1
E(δe(γ−1)|δ(ξ))
< 1, and (∂E(W(ξ))
∂δ̂
|
δ̂=δ(ξ)
, Fδ) >> 0,
∂E(W (ξ))
∂∆T
> 0 and
the policy is welfare improving. 
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